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Abstract:  Agri-environmental  programs  in  Japan  have  generally  been  promoted  through  the  provision  of  fixed 
payments  for  certain  environment-friendly  farming  and  management  practices.  However,  the  auctioning  of  agri-
environmental contracts is a noteworthy alternative for the furtherance of such programs. Conservation auctions are 
used to enhance the cost-effectiveness of public expenses and have been employed in practice as well as tested in 
various pilot projects in some countries. This study uses an experimental economics method to factor the risk attitude 
of participants into a comparison of uniform price (UP) auctions and discriminatory price (DP) auctions. Although 
some studies have compared fixed payments, UP auctions, and DP auctions, the superiority or inferiority of these 
strategies depends on the settings of an experiment. Consequently, experiments reflecting the Japanese situation could 
provide further insight into the advantages of each of these methods, and be used to guide policy design. In addition, 
the study also examines the effects of participants’ risk attitudes on auction performance. Its principal conclusion is 
that DP auctions outperform UP auctions; this is in line with the findings of previous studies. This empirical research 
furthers our understanding of environmental auctions in a first step toward the design of such auctions, but field 
experiments using real farmers should be conducted in order to help corroborate research conclusions before these are 
applied to the real world.
Keywords: conservation auction, experimental economics, risk attitude, environment-friendly farming
1. Introduction
The  Japanese  government  has  recently  begun  to  encourage  environment-friendly  farming.  The  Agricultural 
Environmental Code, which was enacted in 2005, provides a list of production practices that farmers should adopt for 
environmental  conservation.  This  code  initiated  the  implementation  of  cross-compliance  measures  targeted  at 
promoting environmentally beneficial practices. In addition, the government provides support to encourage farmers to 
take up environment-friendly farming practices that must go beyond the “reference level.” For example, it awards 
concessionary loans to “eco-farmers” who adopt sustainable agricultural practices. Moreover, it is in the process of 
finalizing direct payments for environmentally pioneering farming and the promotion of organic farming as defined in 
the Law for Promoting Organic Farming, which was enacted  in 2006. Furthermore, the marginal environmental 
benefits of agricultural production are now considered as important as those of agricultural products are. Table 1 
summarizes existing forms of support and incentives for agri-environmental farming practices.Table 1: Current Agri-environmental Policy Measures
1
Details Policy measures
and compliance with the 
Agricultural Environmental Code
This policy promotes the adoption of and compliance with the code of Agricultural Practice in 




This policy is based on the Law for Promoting the Introduction of Sustainable Agricultural 
Practices. It promotes the certification of “eco-farmers” who practice sustainable farming and 
provides financial and technical support for their activities. There were 167,995 eco-farmers at the 
end of March 2008.
Concessionary loans
Support for pioneering farming
Measures to Conserve and Improve Land, Water and Environment were introduced in 2007. These
support progressive farming activity, which helps conserve local environments by using less than 




c farming In accordance with the Law for Promoting Organic Farming, which was established in 2006, this 
policy promotes the elimination of chemical fertilizer and pesticide from farming practice.
Concessionary loans
tax relief, and the provision of 
payments for pioneering farmer
scheme exists to help maintain and promote the natural circulation function of the agricultural ecosystem (e.g., by enriching biodiversity and creating sustainable 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF 2008)
As shown in Table 1, agri-environmental programs in Japan have generally been promoted through the provision of 
fixed payments and concessionary loans for certain environment-friendly farming or management practices. However, 
the location and quality of farming land, and the production systems used by Japanese farmers, vary enormously, 
especially for small farming households in hilly and mountainous regions. Consequently, fixed payments that are
uniformly distributed across the entire nation cannot correspond to the individual heterogeneity.
Under these circumstances, conservation auctions are a noteworthy alternative. Agri-environmental contracts have 
been auctioned to enhance the cost-effectiveness of public expenses in general practice as well as in various pilot 
projects  in  some  countries.  For  example, the  United  States  of  America  (US),  Australia,  and  selected  European 
countries have recently auctioned environmental contracts. The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP)  uses a  sealed-bid  discriminative  auction  to  obtain  information  about  the 
opportunity costs for private landholders of diverting land from agricultural production and increasing the provision 
of conservation goods. Although Japan has not implemented a policy of auctioning contracts for agri-environmental
conservation, a survey of farmers in hilly and mountainous regions that we conducted in 2008 shows that over 60% of 
the respondents are interested in such a policy (unpublished).
This paper reports on a test-bed laboratory auction that compares uniform price (UP) auctions and discriminatory 
price (DP) auctions to determine which auction policy works best in the Japanese situation. Although some previous 
studies  have  compared  fixed  payments, UP  auctions,  and  DP  auctions (see  e.g.,  Cason  et  al.  2003,  Cason  and 
Gangadharan  2005),  the  superiority  or  inferiority  of  these  strategies  depends  on  the  settings  of  the  experiment. 
Consequently, experiments that reflect the Japanese situation could provide further insight into the advantages of each 
of  these  methods,  and  be  used  for  the  purposes  of  policy  design.  These  approaches  follow  the  idea  of  “design 
economics” (Roth 2002), which not only calls upon economists to analyze markets, but also urges them to design
these using experimental economics and computer simulation.
                                                          
1 Although direct payments to farmers in hilly and  mountainous areas aim to prevent  the abandonment of farming and maintain a range of 
ecosystem services, these payments are not considered part of agri-environmental policy in this study.3
Early work on auctions stems from Friedman’s (1956) seminal paper on the single strategic bidder and Vickrey’s 
treatise (1961) on deriving auction equilibrium using a game-theoretic approach. Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 
(1997)  present  the  advantages  of  auctioning  conservation  management  contracts.  Several  recent  studies  have 
reviewed major findings in the field and investigated the experimental economics approach as it applied to auctions
(see e.g., Ferraro 2008, Rousseau and Moons 2008, Romstad 2009). Ferraro (2008) contends that more theoretical 
work and field and laboratory experimentation are needed before definitive conclusions about the superiority of one 
or more of these approaches can be drawn.
UP auctions require winning bidders to pay a price that may be based on either the highest accepted or the lowest 
rejected bid, while DP auction  winners pay a price based on their own bid (for auction vocabulary, see Ferraro 
[2008]; for a longer review, see Latacz-Lohmann and Schillizi [2005]). DP auctions are more popular among sellers
because these earn payments equal to the sellers’ offer price. However, they also give sellers an incentive to inflate 
their offer price because sellers cannot earn any surplus by submitting an offer equal to their opportunity cost. In both 
types of auctions, sellers submit sealed offers and in UP auctions, successful sellers receive a uniform price (per unit 
of environmental benefit) equal to the highest accepted or lowest rejected offer. In DP auctions, each successful seller 
receives the actual price offered. In UP auctions, all successful sellers receive market-clearing prices that exceed their 
offers and that are set by a seller who does not trade. Thus, sellers have an incentive to reveal their true costs. In 
contrast, DP auctions encourage sellers to misrepresent their costs and to submit offers that are higher than their true 
costs. This paper studies auctions that employ multiple offer rounds per period and multiple potential management
contracts per seller. In these auctions, only the final offer round determines the purchased management contract;
hence, theoretical auctions research cannot directly be applied. In other words, this research is deliberately policy-
oriented and does not aim to test any specific auction theory. Consequently, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem does 
not apply to this study.
Aside from focusing on policy relevance, this study aims to consider how risk attitudes influence individual bidding 
behavior. Since theoretical research cannot be directly applied to the auctions, it is safe to suggest that overbidding in 
common-value first price auctions may be a result of risk aversion (Lind and Plott 1991): the value of the item is 
unknown, so winners bid in excess of this value and thereby lose money. Called the winner’s curse, this phenomenon
occurs if auction winners systematically bid above the actual value of the objects, thereby systematically incurring
losses. Otherwise, risk aversion does not affect incentives in UP auctions (Ferraro 2008).
Theoretical analyses of conservation auctions (see e.g., Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997) assume a risk-neutral 
seller. In addition, previous experimental analyses do not consider the effect of individual risk attitudes on bidding 
behavior and overall market performance. Herein, this point is examined using Japanese environmental parameters
and risk preference data elicited in the laboratory. While risk preferences have historically been estimated through 
historical data, experimental risk-preference elicitation has the advantage of being conducted in a context involving 
the making of real financial decisions (Lusk and Coble 2005). In this study, participants in the conservation auctions
experiment also took part in lottery choice experiments aimed at assessing their individual risk preferences. This 
empirical research could contribute to our understanding of how conservation contracts might perform in Japan.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the design of the experiments for elicit risk attitudes and 
test auction type suitability. Section 3 discusses the results of the experiment. Finally, Section 4 presents the study’s 
conclusions and policy implications.
2. Experimental Design
2.1 Eliciting individual risk preferences from a questionnaire
This study uses Holt and Laury’s (2002) method of eliciting individual risk attitudes, where a menu of paired lottery 
choices is structured so that the crossover points to the high-risk lottery. We utilize this method because it has several 
advantages over  previously  used techniques (Lusk and Coble 2005) and has been widely implemented in recent
experiments (see e.g., Harrison et al. 2007, Andersen et al. 2008). This method requires individuals to make a series 
of ten choices between lotteries A and B, where lottery A is the safe lottery and lottery B is the risky lottery. Table 2
reports the series of decisions subjects were asked to make in all treatments. For each decision, a subject chose either 
option A or option B. The expected payoff difference between each paired choice was not shown to individuals and
one decision was randomly selected in order to decide payment won by individuals. A risk-neutral individual would 
choose  option  A for the first four decisions listed in Table  2 because the expected  value of option  B  for those 
decisions is less.Table 2: The Ten Paired Lottery-choice Decisions
Option A Option B Expected payoff 
difference
1/10 of 1,000 JPY, 9/10 of 800 JPY 1/10 of 1,900 JPY, 9/10 of 100 JPY 540JPY
2/10 of 1,000 JPY, 8/10 of 800 JPY 2/10 of 1,900 JPY, 8/10 of 100 JPY 380JPY
3/10 of 1,000 JPY, 7/10 of 800 JPY 3/10 of 1,900 JPY, 7/10 of 100 JPY 220JPY
4/10 of 1,000 JPY, 6/10 of 800 JPY 4/10 of 1,900 JPY, 6/10 of 100 JPY 60JPY
5/10 of 1,000 JPY, 5/10 of 800 JPY 5/10 of 1,900 JPY, 5/10 of 100 JPY -100JPY
6/10 of 1,000 JPY, 4/10 of 800 JPY 6/10 of 1,900 JPY, 4/10 of 100 JPY -260JPY
7/10 of 1,000 JPY, 3/10 of 800 JPY 7/10 of 1,900 JPY, 3/10 of 100 JPY -420JPY
8/10 of 1,000 JPY, 2/10 of 800 JPY 8/10 of 1,900 JPY, 2/10 of 100 JPY -480JPY
9/10 of 1,000 JPY, 1/10 of 800 JPY 9/10 of 1,900 JPY,1/10 of 100 JPY -640JPY
10/10 of 1,000 JPY, 0/10 of 800 JPY 10/10 of 1,900 JPY, 0/10 of 100 JPY -900JPY
Subjects may exhibit two types of risk aversion:










, where rr is a measure of the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion; or
2. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) = ( ) e
ar x U x
    , where ar is a measure of the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion.
Coefficients corresponding to rr (ar) <0, rr (ar) =0, and rr (ar) >0 are associated with risk-loving, risk-neutral, and 














The second part of the study consists of the conservation auction experiment, which bears similarities to previous 
studies (see e.g., Cason and Gangadharan 2005), but has been modified to reflect the Japanese situation (see Table 3). 
The experiment employs multiple rounds of sealed-bid DP and UP auctions. Auction budgets are constrained but 
unknown to sellers. The pricing rules of DP and UP auctions are compared and consideration is given to the incentive 
of  farmers  (sellers)  to  reveal  the  opportunity  cost  of  agri-environmental  management  practices  that  improve 
environmental quality. The environmental benefits of the sellers’ proposed management contracts is concealed in 
order to better simulate real life, where farmers know the costs associated with conservation management and their 
impact  on  profits,  but  do  not  usually  possess information  about  the  environmental  benefits  associated  with  the 
conservation of farmland assets. Only final round bids are analyzed because sellers use the preceding rounds to gain 
an understanding of these environmental benefits. In order to control the potential for collusion between  sellers, 
communications between sellers during auctions are prohibited. Specific environmental parameters are explained in 
the next section.5
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√ √ √ √ √ √
Sasaki et al. (2010) √ √ √ √ √ √
2.3 Environment parameters and auction procedures
Six sessions of each type of auction were conducted, each with eight sellers. This called for a total of 96 participants.
Each session consisted of three periods, which in turn consisted of three to five offer rounds. The number of periods 
and rounds in each session was unknown to sellers, who submitted sealed offers. In the UP auctions, successful 
sellers received a uniform price (per unit of environmental benefit) equal to the lowest rejected offer; in the DP
auctions,  successful  sellers  received  the  actual  prices  offered.  Auction  periods were  declared  final  when  a 
predetermined maximum number of rounds was reached, upon which the next period was started using different cost 
information. Sellers did not have knowledge of the buyers’ budget, which was fixed at 50% of total opportunity cost.
Figure 1 summarizes the timeline and steps of each session.
Figure 1: The Timeline and Steps of Each Round and Period
In each offer round, sellers submitted offer sheets that specified a desired sale price for each of three items that 
corresponded to different agri-environment-friendly management practices, although natural terminology was used to 
refer to these practices (see Table 4). The red, blue, and yellow items correspond to the agri-environment-friendly 
management practices of the application of manure at the ratio of one ton for every ten are (a) of land (1t/10a) (for 
carbon sequestration), a 50% reduction in the application of pesticide and chemical fertilizer (for water quality), and 
the maintenance of channels through weeding and mud-dredging (for biodiversity), respectively.
In addition, discrete environmental benefits can be obtained from each of the management practices because the 
practices are relatively independent. Consequently, the instructions explained that each seller would buy more than 































Sessiontwo items in different colors. This rule setting differs from that of Cason et al. (2003) and Cason and Gangadharan 
(2005).
In their instructions, Cason et al. (2003) and Cason and Gangadharan (2005) use the term “quality” to refer to the 
environmental benefits of each item. However, our instructions describe these benefits as the “gold content” of the 
items desired by the buyer in order to improve the seller’s understanding of the auction rule. This is based on the 
feedback we obtained from pre-experiments.
Sellers knew only their costs and had no information about the costs and environmental benefits (gold content) of 
other  sellers.  Neither  did  they  know  the  government’s  budget,  which  was  fixed  at 50% of  total  project  cost 
(opportunity cost) in all periods.
Table 4: Natural Terminology and Corresponding Management Practices






 Application of manure at 1t/10a (for carbon sequestration)
 50% reduction in the application of pesticide and chemical 
fertilizer (for water quality)
 Maintenance of channels through weeding and mud-
dredging (for biodiversity)
Sale of item Implementation of environment-friendly farm management
Item offer Cost offered by individual farmers
Commission for sale of item Real cost (opportunity cost) of individual farmers
The item’s gold content Environmental benefits (to be evaluated by indicator or in monetary
terms)
2.4 Cost and environmental benefit parameters
We selected cost and benefit parameters that approximate the opportunities for environmental improvement through 
agri-environmental management in Japan. Table 5 presents the cost and environmental quality parameters used in the 
experiments. The exact cost and environmental benefit parameter of each practice was drawn independently from a 
uniform distribution with the  indicated range. Consequently, sellers had different cost and environmental quality 
parameters that represented the heterogeneity of cost and environmental benefits among and within the practices.
2.4.1 Carbon sequestration through the application of manure at 1t/10a 
Soil carbon stock is heavily affected by fertilizer management. Therefore, appropriate amounts of organic fertilizer 
could increase the carbon content of soil and reduce total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
2 In addition, Japanese 
weather conditions make organic input well suited to the foregoing tasks. This is in contrast to no-tillage, which is 
unlikely to be a promising technique of suppressing carbon release from arable soil because Japan’s high-humidity 
and high-temperature climate has made vigorous weed growth a serious bottleneck.
It  is  assumed  that  organic  fertilizer  (manure)  will  be  spread  at  1t/10a.  Cost  data  consists  of  manure  price, 
transportation costs, and application costs. The average cost of manure application per ton is 7,950 Japanese yen 
(JPY), according to field survey data by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF, 2008).
The benefit of this practice is the increase in the amount of soil carbon through the application of manure, and is 
estimated at 0.0584C-t/10a (0.214 tons of carbon dioxide [CO2]/10a) by MAFF. In 2009, the price of one ton of CO2
                                                          
2 Organic fertilizer applications help maintain soil fertility and create an environmental trade-off between methane (CH4) emissions and soil carbon 
sequestration. Studies on comprehensive carbon dynamics are limited to paddy fields. Although this study does not cover the effects of manure 
application on CH4 emissions, Sasaki (2010) shows that manure application (1–1.5t/10a) has a positive net effect on Japanese paddy and cropland 
(it decreases greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions).7
was ten to fifteen Euros (EUR) per CO2-t (approximately 1,100–1,650JPY per CO2-t) under the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Therefore, the benefit of carbon sequestration per ten acres is estimated at
298JPY.
2.4.2 The improvement of water quality through a 50% reduction in the application of pesticide and chemical 
fertilizer
The next environmental issue is the improvement of water quality. The government currently makes fixed payments
to farmers who use less than 50% of the amount of chemical fertilizers and synthetic agricultural chemicals than is 
consumed in conventional application (see Table 1). This is to support progressive farming activity and conserve
local environments, and is assumed to cost 6,000JPY/10a (MAFF). Its benefits are calculated at 857JPY/10a by the 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) survey in Shiga prefecture, Japan
3.
2.4.3 The enhancement of biodiversity through the maintenance of channels via weeding and mud-dredging
The Japanese government supports cooperative conservation action by local farmers, such as the maintenance of
channels through weeding and mud-dredging, by making direct payments for such action at a rate of 4,400 JPY/10a.
This support is targeted at more than simply improving biodiversity, but has been used to represent the cost of the 
foregoing because no other precise data is available. Its benefits are estimated at 858JPY/10a (the CVM survey, cited
in Aizaki et al. 2006).
All costs and benefits were assumed to have a range of ±20% from their average value for individual farmers.
Table 5: Cost and Benefit Data for Conservation Auctions
Activities Application of manure at 1t/10a 
(for carbon sequestration)
50% reduction of pesticide and 
chemical fertilizer application 
(for water quality)
Maintenance of channel 
through weeding and dredging 


















In both auction formats, once the auctioneer received the sellers’ submissions, calculated the ratio of their offer price 
to their benefit, and then prioritized projects according to this ratio from the lowest to the highest in each period. In 
the DP auctions, each successful seller received the actual price that they had offered. In the UP auctions, all the 
successful sellers received market-clearing prices that exceeded their offers.
Table 6 presents an example of one period of a UP auction. The column “ratio rank” shows the sellers’ ranking. 
Sellers 1, 6, and 7 can sell their red items, but seller 3 (ranked fourth) cannot because no additional item can be 
purchased with the remaining the auction budget. All the red items are sold at the offer/benefit ratio of seller 1, who 
submitted  the  highest  ratio  (27.07)  of  all  the  accepted  bids.  Consequently,  seller  6  receives  27.07  times  their 
environmental benefit of 357JPY (i.e., 9,664JPY) instead of their red item offer of 7,700JPY; similarly, seller 7
receives 27.07 times their environmental benefit of 277JPY (i.e., 7,498JPY), and seller 1 receives their own offer of 
8,500JPY. This rule was applied to the blue and yellow items in the same manner. Finally, sellers’ benefits were 
calculated based on the winners’ project cost and sale price.
                                                          
3 Estimated over all benefit in the Shiga prefecture was 7,879 million JPY (PRIMAFF and Shiga, 2003) and total agricultural land was 44,180ha. 
Consequently, 857JPY/10a is obtained.Table 6: Example Cost, Benefit, Offer, and Winner Decision (UP)
Project cost Project benefit Cost/benefit Offer Offer/benefit ratio Ratio rank
Seller ID R B Y R B Y R B R R B Y R B Y R B Y
1 8456 6929 4698 314 993 868 27 7 5 8500 6930 4700 27 7 5 3 6 4
2 7333 5914 5182 289 973 738 25 6 7 8243 6349 5183 29 7 7 5 4 8
3 7151 5325 4437 249 797 757 29 7 6 7000 5200 4300 28 7 6 4 3 7
4 8798 6645 4496 275 838 809 32 8 6 8850 6700 4400 32 8 5 8 8 5
5 7749 6421 4411 295 1025 1013 26 6 4 8500 6700 5100 29 7 5 7 5 3
6 6649 5528 4020 357 969 798 19 6 5 7700 5300 3200 22 5 4 1 1 1
7 7284 5924 4481 277 956 1016 26 6 4 7400 6200 4580 27 6 5 2 2 2
8 8812 5100 4297 348 797 771 25 6 6 10000 6000 4300 29 8 6 6 7 6
Project sold? Sale price (UP) Benefit of seller
Seller ID R B Y R B Y R B Y
1 1 0 0 8500 0 0 44 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 5200 0 0 -125 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 1 0 0 5100 0 0 689
6 1 1 1 9664 6322 4018 3015 794 -2
7 1 1 1 7498 6237 5115 214 313 634
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. Results
3.1 Preliminaries
Ninety-six university students at Japan’s Shiga University took part in these experiments, which were conducted from 
November 2008 to June 2009. At the beginning of each session, the subjects were organized into a group of eight 
persons. Each session consisted of a lottery choice experiment and an auction experiment, and each type of auction 
was conducted six times. There were three periods in each session and each period consisted of three to five rounds,
but subjects were told that each session would last an unknown number of periods and rounds.
At the completion of the experiment, each subject was paid earnings equal to the conversion of their laboratory 
market earnings to Japanese yen. The conversion rate was not announced until all the sessions had ended. Sessions 
typically lasted 90  minutes, including instruction time. Average  subject earnings  were about US$40  (4,320JPY), 
depending upon individual performances during the experiments.
3.2 Risk attitudes
Before the data was analyzed, portions of data that were inconsistent with the lottery choices were excluded. Table 7
reports  the  distributions  of  the  number  of  safe  choices  made  by  each  included  subject  and  Figure  2  plots  the 
percentage of safe choices in each of the ten decision tasks shown in Table 7. First, it is apparent that the majority of 
subjects in the sample are risk averse, and this is consistent with previous studies (see e.g., Lusk and Coble 2008). A 
risk-averse individual would choose option A for the first four decision tasks; the majority of respondents chose 
option A five or more times.
4 However, risk-loving and risk-neutral individuals also exist, making up 39% of the 
sample. Second, there are no significant differences between subjects in UP sessions and subjects in DP sessions.
                                                          
4 We also conducted a mail survey of Japanese farmers in hilly and mountainous regions in 2008. Three thousand and forty-three questionnaires
were circulated to fifteen randomly selected regions and overall response rate was 14.4%. No significant differences are observed in risk preference 9
Table 7: Risk Aversion Classification Based on Lottery Choices
Number of safe 
choices
Range of relative risk 
aversion
(1)









0–1 rr<-0.97 ar<-0.11 Highly risk-loving 0 0%
2 -0.97<rr<-0.49 -0.11<ar<-0.06 Very risk-loving 2 2%
3 -0.49<rr<-0.12 -0.06<ar<-0.02 Risk-loving 12 14%
4 -0.12<rr<0.19 -0.02<ar<0.03 Risk-neutral 20 23%
5 0.19<rr<0.49 0.03<ar<0.07 Slightly risk-averse 8 9%
6 0.49<rr<0.79 0.07<ar<0.11 Risk-averse 25 29%
7 0.79<rr<1.12 0.11<ar<0.17 Very risk-averse 15 17%
8 1.13<rr<1.61 0.17<ar<0.25 Highly risk-averse 3 3%
9–10 1.61<rr 0.25<ar Stay in bed 2 2%
SUM 87 100%
(1)Assuming U(x) = x
(1-rr)/1-rr
(2)Assuming U (x) = -exp(-ar*x)


















3.3.1 Overall market performance
Figures 3 and 4 summarize the offer data with scatter plots that display the final round offers of auction sellers against 
their  cost  draws  for  the  three  types  of  environmental  externalities  (carbon  sequestration,  water  quality,  and 
biodiversity). In DP auctions, 93.3% of offers exceed costs, as expected. On the contrary, the scatter plot of offers for 
UP auctions is more centered on the “offer = cost” line, with 80.6% of offers exceeding costs. Table 8 shows that the 
percentage of offers above cost does not differ significantly between project types.
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Table 8: The Percentage of Above-cost Offers for Different Auction and Project Types
DP UP
No. of 
observations No. above cost % No. of 
observations No. above cost %
R (high-cost management) 144 135 93.8% 144 118 81.9%
B (medium-cost management) 144 133 92.4% 144 117 81.3%
Y (low-cost management) 144 135 93.8% 144 113 78.5%






Figure 4: Individual Offers in the Final Round (UP)
Offer 
Figure 3: Individual Offers in the Final Round (DP)11
In the next step, overall market performances are provided based on Cason et. al’s (2003) method, which differ from 
the typical efficiency measure used in laboratory experiments because they need to evaluate the conservation auctions
not only for cost efficiency, but also for environmental effectiveness. To assess these, the following market measures 
are introduced:
 ENV(environmental effectiveness: for the percentage of maximum environmental benefit realized)
 COST (cost efficiency: for the percentage of optimal cost effectiveness)
As one of the most important policy targets of the conservation auctions, high levels of environmental benefit need to 
have  been  achieved  with  the  given  budgets  in  order  for  the  auctions  to  be  adjudged  environmentally  effective. 
Therefore, the auctions need to have selected as many management practices as possible, or chosen those that give the 
highest amount of environmental benefit. In addition, the least costly projects should have been selected.
The overall performances of the three management practices in DP and UP auctions are reported in Table 9 and 10 
respectively. Both ENV and COST are slightly greater in DP than in UP, although the Mann-Whitney test did not 
reject  the  hypothesis  of  equal  efficiency  across  treatment for  either  measure.  Nevertheless,  results  for  high-cost 
management projects (represented by the red item—manure management for carbon sequestration) show that ENV 
scores a much lower value in UP than it does in DP (p-value = 0.031).
Under the auction settings, a sale of three to four practices per round is considered acceptable because the sellers’ 
budgets are constrained at half their total opportunity cost. In rounds that resulted in the sale of four practices, ENV 
values of close to 100% represent successful contracts. (These values are underlined in Tables 9 and 10.) The number 
of successful contracts differs significantly across DP and UP auctions, coming in at 23% (23/108) in DP auctions
and 12% (12/108) in UP auctions. It is conjectured that the inefficiency of UP auctions is caused by the UP pricing 
rule, which creates much greater levels of overcompensation than those produced by overbidding in DP.
Another  measure  of the  efficiency of the  two  auction  types is the  comparison of  seller  profits, which represent 
government  overspending  relative  to  the  actual  cost  of  implementing  agri-environment-friendly  management
practices. Tables 9 and 10 show seller profits in DP and UP auctions respectively. Seller profits achieve an average of 
3,581JPY in DP auctions and 5,017 JPY in UP auctions. The Mann-Whitney test strongly rejects the hypothesis of 
equal seller profits across treatment (p-value = 0.0033). Seller profits are significantly higher in UP.
Thus, DP auctions outperform UP auctions as far as environmental effectiveness and government expenditure savings
are concerned. However, relationship between average individual risk attitudes and overall market performance are
not significant (see also the bottom line of Table 9 and 10), because market performance measures used here can not 
include the losers’ attitudes. In order to study the foregoing, the next section considers individual bidding behavior 
and risk attitudes.Table 9: Overall Session Performance and Individual Risk Attitudes (DP)








































ENV 77% 77% 79% 72% 100% 79% 77% 100% 100% 98% 101% 100% 76% 100% 104% 72% 100% 100% 89.7%
Carbon
COST 98% 93% 94% 99% 98% 93% 97% 97% 97% 99% 95% 97% 93% 94% 91% 99% 96% 94% 95.7%
ENV 71% 97% 76% 76% 100% 78% 70% 98% 99% 74% 76% 100% 76% 76% 100% 76% 100% 100% 85.7%
Water quality
COST 94% 94% 90% 96% 94% 91% 94% 94% 92% 98% 94% 96% 94% 93% 94% 96% 94% 92% 93.8%
ENV 77% 100% 97% 77% 74% 76% 72% 74% 74% 100% 76% 100% 78% 100% 74% 84% 74% 74% 82.3%
Biodiversity
COST 90% 94% 93% 95% 95% 93% 91% 97% 96% 98% 94% 96% 89% 94% 94% 103% 96% 94% 94.6%
Seller profit (JPY) 3779 4592 4695 2891 2883 5979 3208 2140 3726 -724 3532 2569 5502 4218 4085 3272 3431 4680 3581
No. of safe choices 5.5 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.9 4.6 5.3
Table 10: Overall Session Performance and Individual Risk Attitudes (UP)








































ENV 74% 76% 79% 76% 77% 83% 73% 78% 79% 77% 76% 79% 78% 78% 79% 91% 78% 79% 78.4%
Carbon
COST 88% 104% 89% 90% 91% 95% 93% 89% 90% 90% 90% 91% 90% 96% 92% 91% 95% 92% 92.0%
ENV 69% 100% 78% 69% 100% 97% 76% 100% 78% 90% 75% 78% 76% 76% 76% 90% 73% 78% 82.2%
Water quality
COST 93% 93% 94% 94% 97% 99% 94% 92% 91% 95% 93% 89% 94% 93% 93% 95% 89% 91% 93.4%
ENV 77% 75% 100% 77% 74% 94% 70% 76% 100% 77% 74% 100% 78% 74% 74% 77% 74% 100% 81.6%
Biodiversity
COST 95% 93% 96% 91% 94% 91% 90% 92% 96% 91% 90% 95% 88% 93% 96% 90% 90% 95% 92.6%
Seller profit (JPY) 5577 808 6020 5929 4682 1961 3885 6282 6271 6073 6366 6836 6350 3475 4989 3301 5557 5936 5017
No. of safe choices 5.4 5.6 5.9 4.9 5.3 4.6 5.313
3.3.2 Offer behavior and risk attitudes
This section describes sellers’ risk attitudes in detail. The experiment drew upon a set of eight sellers with three items 
each. Six sessions of each type of auction were conducted, with each session consisting of three periods. Thus, each 
auction type comprised 432 cost draws, of which only final round bids are analyzed here:
8 sellers × 3 items × 6 sessions × 3 periods = 432 cost draws
Ferraro (2008) have already mention about the role of risk attitude in auctioning conservation contracts from previous 
studies  that  under  standard  assumptions  the  DP  and  UP  formats  yield  the  same  expenditures  (Milgrom,  2004), 
however, the characteristics of conservation procurement auctions are unlikely to result in expenditure neutrality.
Risk-loving and risk-neutral are defined here as those who chose less than four safe choices at the lottery choice 
experiment, while the highly risk averse are those opted for more than eight safe choices. Data that were inconsistent
with the lottery decision choices and negative bid in DP were excluded. The significant relationship between risk 
attitude and bidding behavior is shown by the difference in opportunity cost between individual sellers in DP (Table 
11), however not for slightly risk averse individuals. Risk-averse individuals are aggressive to win the auction in 
comparison with risk-loving and risk-neutral sellers in the DP auctions. Therefore, in the conservation procurement 
auction, risk-averse  landowners have an  incentive  to  reduce  their bid-prices  below the  bid-prices  of risk neutral 
landowners. Otherwise, risk aversion does not affect incentives in UP auctions as predicted.
The bidding behavior in the DP auctions is consistent with conjecture by economists (see e.g., Lind and Plott 1991), 
who explain it as a form of risk aversion that drives bidders to spend more money (decrease benefit) so that they can 
be sure of a win, rather than risk losing. Another explanation is that the element of competition drives sellers to
aggressive bid so that they can experience the joy of winning.
5
Table 11: Bidding Behavior and Risk Attitudes
DP UP











Risk loving and neutral less than 4 247 138 68 153
8 185 9 62 18
Highly risk averse
9 74 17 n.a. n.a.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Auctions provide a noteworthy alternative for the promotion of agri-environmental programs in Japan, although the 
dominant practice of doing so thus far has been to offer fixed payments for certain environment-friendly farming and 
management practices. In fact, over 60% of farmers in hilly and mountainous regions are interested in supporting 
agri-environmental conservation through the auctioning of contracts.
The laboratory auctions conducted in this research compare the performance of DP and UP auctions in three different 
environmental applications tailored to the Japanese situation. In addition, the auctions also consider the effect of 
individual risk preferences on performance outcomes.
The results show that DP auctions outperform UP auctions in terms of environmental effectiveness and government 
expenditure  savings, even though  UP  auctions have better  cost revelation incentives.  This is consistent  with the 
principal results of Cason and Gangadharan (2005) and is despite the fact that sellers in DP auctions overbid.
Policymakers are beginning to understand that the effect of individual risk attitudes on policy outcome is an important 
element in the creation of appropriate agri-environmental policies. In fact, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department 
                                                          
5 In addition to these economic explanations of overbidding, Delgado et al. (2008) combine neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques to 
argue that there may be yet another factor causing overbidding in normal auctions, namely loss contemplation in a social context (i.e., the fear of 
losing).for Environment,  Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2008) announced that internal  factors need to be identified 
before  policy  interventions  are  made,  and  said  that  it  was  important  to  recognize  and  respond  to  individual 
characteristics by putting them at the forefront of policy development.
If DP auctions are chosen for field application, it will be necessary to develop an Environmental Benefit Index (EBI)
based on scientific evidence so that farmers do not succumb to the winner’s curse, although winners curse effect 
cannot  be  explained  single  element  (Holt  and  Sherman,  2000).  Conservation  auctions  are  assumed  to  have 
independent private values if the environmental benefit is clearly known. But in practice conservation procurement 
auctions may have common-value elements. Currently, little is known of the relative costs and benefits of using 
agricultural  land (especially  rice  paddy  fields)  instead  of  other  land  use  types  to  provide  ecosystem  services 
(Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  [OECD]  2008).  Concealing  information  about  the
environmental benefits of agri-environmental managements may improve regulatory efficiency.
The conclusion that DP auctions outperform UP auctions is in line with previous studies, but may not hold in all 
circumstances. However, as the first step toward designing conservation auctions, this empirical research deepens our 
understanding of the field potential of such auctions. The next step forward is to test the research findings by 
conducting field experiments using real farmers.
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